We provide an analytical narrative of the political and economic causes and consequences of institutional changes in the Argentine banking system. We devote most of our attention to the privatization of the provincial banks. Our story differs from the prevailing wisdom in its stress on the key roles played by convertibility and an independent Central Bank rather than the Fondo Fiduciario. 
I. Introduction
In this paper we analyze the roles of crisis and path dependence in determining the revolutionary and evolutionary changes in the banking system in Argentina under the Convertibility Plan. The Argentine banking system underwent two revolutionary changes in the In Section II we discuss the economic conditions leading to the Argentine Convertibility
Plan. In Section III we use an institutional framework that incorporates both political and economic factors to interpret the time path of the evolution and revolution in the Argentine banking system. Next, (Section IV), we present evidence on individual Provincial banks, indicating the importance of public loans in explaining the likelihood of subsequent privatization.
Finally, in Section V we present econometric tests of causality between institutional change and indicators of the banking system, e.g. deposits and credit. The results are consistent with the institutional narrative presented in the preceding sections.
II. Crisis and the Convertibility Plan
"Of fixing an exchange value relative to circulating paper money, with the objective of avoiding great oscillations which cause great unrest for commerce…not only to maintain morale and public faith, but also to prevent the demonetization of paper itself…"
Norberto de la Riestra recommendation to President
Mitre to establish Convertibility in December 1862. 1 For most of Latin America the 1980s were the "lost decade" in terms of economic performance. Economic growth was near zero, and external debt was high and mounting. In Argentina, like other countries, the policy of import substitution was abandoned and replaced with economic liberalization. Argentina finished the decade with a hyperinflation. This in turn ushered in a brief affair with monetary orthodoxy which, given the institutions in place, could not be maintained. By the beginning of 1991 a new hyperinflation ensued. Grasping at straws, the government pegged the exchange rate within a floating band but this too did not work. The government was looking for a credible commitment mechanism to ensure a stable monetary policy.
As the quote above demonstrates, Argentina had initiated an earlier Convertibility Plan.
Convertibility is a monetary straitjacket and hence its appeal as a commitment device. The
Convertibility Plan went into effect in April 1991. The convertibility law pegged the exchange rate at 1 U.S. dollar equal to 10,000 Australs 2 . The law stipulated that Central Bank reserves (gold and foreign currencies) had to equal 100% of the monetary base and could only be used to maintain the exchange rate (hence the term convertibility). The Central Bank essentially became a currency board whose mission was to exchange dollars for Australs at a fixed rate. 3 Global financial markets viewed the law as credible because the Argentine Central Bank had the necessary reserves to cover the monetary base, i.e., the capacity to exchange all the australs in the economy for dollars. Furthermore, there were other signs of commitment: privatization of public enterprises, an openness to imports, a reduction in public employment which helped 1 Quote extracted from "The Politics of Money in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Argentina." Jeremy Adelman, in "The New Insitutional Economics and Third World Develpoment." 2 The peso replaced the Austral in January 1992, after which 1 US dollar = 1 Argentinean peso. 3 The Convertibility Law established: "At all times gold and foreign currency reserves of free availability in the Central Bank of the Argentine Republic will be equivalent to one hundred percent of the monetary base at least." Article 5 of the law forbade seizure: "The goods named before, that are part of the reserves cannot be under seizure and should be used for the objectives provided in the present law only."
combat fiscal deficits, and most importantly the establishment of an independent Central Bank in Figure   1 we show the process of inflationary financing before the Convertibility Plan. 4 In Figure 2 , we show loans to the public sector as a percentage of total loans. Before convertibility the public banks (National, Provincial, and Municipal) held over 30% of their loan portfolio in public sector loans. This dwarfs the loans to the public sector held by private banks. Outside of Buenos Aires, private banks held only about 1% of their loan portfolio as loans to the public sector. If many of these loans were based on political considerations and, subsequently in default, then we should observe considerable lending to the public banks from the Central Bank. We do.
In 1991, loans from the Central Bank to the Provincial banks amounted to 70% of the assets of Provincial banks (Central Bank Boletin Estadistico (Several issues) and Ministry of Economy). 4 We stress that, prior to convertibility, Provincial bank lending for political purposes was not the major source of inflation. Several sources rank higher: the overall fiscal deficit of the federal government, the deficits of public firms, the deficit of the social security system, and the fiscal deficits of the provinces. But, after convertibility and the accompanying structural reforms at the federal level, the fiscal deficits of provinces and lending practices of Provincial banks became more of a threat to the political sustainability In 1991 when Argentina initiated the Convertibilty Plan many of the Provincial banks were heavily indebted to the Central Bank. In Figure 3 we show the debt to deposit ratios for Provincial banks with Central Banks. The high debts are consistent with the our framework indicating that public banks financed "political" loans and had to turn to the Central Bank to remain afloat.
of convertibility.IMF officials stressed the importance of reducing provinical deficits in its recent negotiations over the loan to Argentina in January 2000. Source: Banco Central de la República Argentina and CTA(1996) This process had to be stopped if the Convertibility Plan was to succeed. As noted above the Carta Orgánica del Banco Central dictated independence from the executive branch and prohibited the Central Bank from giving loans to the government. Furthermore, the Central Bank could only buy government bonds at market prices. The law also established the Superintendencia de Bancos, whose function it is to regulate and audit the activity of banks. In Figure 4 Convertibility Plan generated a huge inflow of foreign capital (direct investment and short-term financial capital), stimulating economic growth via an increase in the money supply. The mechanism worked as follows: the increased capital into the Argentine system produced an increased number of dollars in the system. The Central Bank buys these dollars (or they go directly to banks as dollar deposits -Argentina has a bimonetary financial system) and, in this way, creates money. The increase in money supply generates a decline in interest rates and as a result increased investment, thereby increasing economic growth. growth rate of the economy during capital inflows but it correspondingly maximizes the decline in economic growth during capital outflows.
The prosperity brought about by the Convertibility Plan significantly reduced the debt burden of most of the Provincial banks and in particular the debts that Provincial banks had with the Central Bank. In Table 1 , we show the debt/deposit ratios of Provincial banks immediately following the initiation of the Convertibility Plan in 1991 and its effects three years later. Overall the debt/deposit ratio of the Provincial banks with respect to the Central Bank fell from 49% to 4%, though the debt/deposit ratio with other banks and international organizations took up some of the slack, increasing to nearly 20%. The flow of foreign capital into Argentina was a sign of the outside world's faith in the new financial system. (1996) But the success of convertibility and the inflow of deposits allowed the Provincial banks to continue their practice of making loans to the public sector, though at a diminished rate. By 1994, the public sector loans as a percentage of total loans had fallen from 31% in 1991 to 17% in 1994.
Rather than being forced to privatize, the Convertibility Plan enabled the Provincial banks to maintain the status quo. Undoubtedly, this was an unintended consequence of convertibility. In 1994 Provincial banks still had 30% of their loans as nonperforming.
The banking system is particularly important under the Convertibility Plan because banks are the conduits for capital flows. Deposits rise and fall in accordance with the flows. As a result of the variability of deposits, banks can experience serious liquidity problems during periods of capital outflows. The situation is exacerbated because the convertibility of the exchange rate means the relatively "inconvertibility" of deposits: if the reserves of the Central Bank are maintained in order to maintain the exchange rate, there is no role of lender of last resort for the Central Bank. Because of this inherent problem, it was recognized that banks must have their houses in order. 5 In Argentina it was recognized that bank reform was needed for both private and public banks. In particular, there were calls for the privatization of Provincial banks that had made a practice of making large loans to Provincial governments backed only with political capital. Despite recognition of the problem, little privatization initially occurred in the banking system because the initial capital inflows from the Convertibility Plan enabled the Provincial banks to stay afloat despite their loan portfolio. But the situation was not sustainable and awaited the Tequila Crisis. With this preview we now turn to an analysis of the evolution and revolution in the banking system.
III. The Banking System: Reform from the Center and Resistance on the Periphery
During the early years of the Convertibility Plan, there was considerable evolution in the banking system, especially with regard to the Central Bank. Because there were strict limits to the Central Bank's ability to behave as a lender of last resort during a financial crisis, they imposed high reserve and capital requirements along with other regulations. 6 With the Convertibility Plan, the central government encouraged privatization of public enterprises and, in particular public banks. As part of their commitment, the central government rebated tax revenue to the provinces 5 This is not a problem specific to Convertibility Plans but the mismatch in term structures between deposits and loans is exacerbated by the lack of policy instruments available to a Central Bank under a convertibility arrangement. Bank regulation has received increased attention by policy makers in the wake of bank failures following the financial crises of the 1990s. In order to minimize future bank failures the I.M.F., along with the Basle Committee, has established guidelines for banking regulation. See "Report on the Working Group on Strengthening Financial Systems." I.M.F. October 1998. 6 The regulatory framework in Argentina is tighter than the recommendations of the Basle Committee.
with the understanding that this would smooth the transition from public to private enterprises.
But, privatization was resisted because of the benefits received by Provincial politicians. By January 1995 only 3 Provincial banks had been privatized, and one of the banks privatized was from Menem's province of La Rioja. 7 In Table 2 , we list the Provincial banks that have been privatized. Note the generally long lag between the law or decree initiating privatization and the call to offer the bank for sale, and the lag between the call for sale and ultimate privatization. All but the first two bank privatizations received money from the fiduciary fund. In Figure 5 we show the amount of lending to governments by the type of banks in Argentina. All public banks lent considerably more to governments than private banks even following the Convertibility Plan. Furthermore, many of these loans were non-performing. In Figure 6 we show the percentage of loans that were in default across the types of banks in 7 The Bank of La Rioja went "bankrupt" in 1991 and was forced to close by the Central Bank. It was reorganized by the legislature of La Rioja as the Nuevo Banco de La Rioja and privatized in 1994. The loans in default compared to under 10% for private banks. In the next two years the situation worsened, except for foreign banks. Clearly, at the time of the Mexican Crisis in December 1994, the Provincial banks were in much worse financial shape than the private banks. Yet, they were not forced into bankruptcy because of the large inflows of deposits into the system following the Convertibility Plan. (See Table 3 .)
The increase for the system of Provincial Banks was an astonishing 170% between 1991 and 1994. But, the huge inflows of capital and deposits brought about by the Convertibility Plan were to reverse into outflows with the Mexican Crisis. despite the soundness of most of the economies. 8 The trigger for the crisis in Argentina was 8 There is still not a consensus on the reasons for the spread of the crisis to Argentina. A few days before the devaluation in Mexico the probability of a crisis in Argentina was considered insignificant by most economists. After the fact, some economists attribute the contagion to "herd" behavior. (See Calvo 1996 and 1999 Other explanations are more simplistic: because Argentina devalued following the last Mexican crisis, they would do so again. Finally, there are models that rely on assumptions of limited insolvency of the Extrader bank 9 , which had a substantial part of its portfolio invested in Mexican government bonds. The sudden devaluation of the Mexican peso sparked a liquidity crisis for the Extrader bank and a rush by depositors to get their money out. Though the rest of the system was for the most part sound, the run on Extrader spread across the domestic banking system. Deposits fell across the banks in the domestic sector in the early months of 1995. Between December 1994
and June 1995 deposits fell over 10% in National Public banks and Argentine owned private banks while deposits fell over 5% in Provincial and Municipal banks. During the same period deposits in foreign-owned banks increased 5% (Central Bank and Ministry of Economy).
Depositors were shifting away from the domestic banks with perceived bad loan portfolios. 10 The
Central Bank and the central government were forced to act in the face of what was now a crisis.
The banking system was near collapse and policy options were limited. On the one hand, the government could have devalued and confirmed the expectations that had brought about the crisis. But this had huge political as well as economic costs. On the political side, the reputation The Argentine Central Bank moved swiftly to stop the fear of devaluation and limit the runs on banks. In January 1995 it denominated in dollars all deposits that commercial banks held with the Central Bank. Between January and April 1995 Argentina put in place the following: 1) a $1 billion safety net to help private banks with liquidity problems (January); 2) a deposit rationality with the result that multiple equilibria are possible or "anything could happen." (Calvo(1996) , (1999), Mendoza(1998), Obstfeld(1986) . 9 The Extrader bank was ordered to close on February 1995 by a court order. 10 The movement towards foreign banks continued after the crisis. Today, 49% of bank assets are in Figure 4 , severed the monetization of the debts of the Provincial banks. Once the Central Bank no longer could be relied upon to cover the bad loans of the Provincial banks they were only kept alive by the injection of deposits into the system. As long as there were deposits rolling into the Provincial banks, they were able to satisfy the requests for public loans by the Provincial politicians. This is why the Provincial politicians resisted privatization. But, as soon as there was a deposit outflow, many of the Provincial banks would be bankrupt and they would die;
the Fondo Fiduciario made the deaths relatively painless on the creditors, and perhaps it saved the political lives of many of the Provincial politicians. Provincial politicians with bankrupt banks no longer had an incentive to resist privatization because the banks could no longer lend them money. Indeed, the Provincial politicians open-heartedly supported the creation of the Fondo 11 The practice of denominating in dollars began in the earlier hyperinflation periods of 1989 and 1991. 12 The reduction in reserve requirements injected $2.7 billion into the system. 13 For more detail on the changes see the appendix.
Fiduciario. In Figure 7 , we show the relationship following the Tequila Crisis among the Provincial banks, the Provincial politicians, the central government and the Central Bank.
Figure 7
Provincial Governments themselves of the opportunity to privatize; in Figure 8 we show that those banks most burdened with nonperforming loans privatized earlier. The relationship between privatization and indebtedness to other banks and multilateral institutions tells the same story (See Figure 9 ).
Figure 9
Indebtedness of the Provincial Banks with Other Banks and the World Bank (1994) Source: CTA(1996) Coincident with encouraging privatization, additional evolutionary regulatory steps were taken to solidify the financial system. (See the appendix for a list of the regulatory changes.)
Depositors also shifted assets to larger domestic and foreign banks and, as a consequence a merger wave spread through the banking system: between January 1995 and December 1998 the number of banks fell from 206 to 130. (See Figure 10) . A majority of the consolidation took place in 1995, following the Tequila crisis. With the stronger financial system that emerged in the wake of the Tequila Crisis, the Argentine banking system weathered the Asian and Russian financial crises in good shape. Banks privatized in 1998
Public Banks
Figure 10
Source: Central Bank of the Argentine Republic.
V. The Causes and Consequences of Institutional Reform in Banking
In the preceding narrative we argued that major institutional reforms result from crises, and that, once in place, institutional deepening occurs through an evolutionary process. J a n -9 4 M a r-9 4 M a y -9 4 J u l -9 4 S e p -9 4 N o v -9 4 J a n -9 5 M a r-9 5 M a y -9 5 J u l -9 5 S e p -9 5 N o v -9 5 J a n -9 6 M a r-9 6 M a y -9 6 J u l -9 6 S e p -9 6 N o v -9 6 J a n -9 7 M a r-9 7 M a y -9 7 J u l -9 7 S e p -9 7 N o v -9 7 J a n -9 8 M a r-9 8 M a y -9 8 J u l -9 8 S e p - 9 8 N o v -9 8 In this section we provide quantitative evidence consistent with our narrative of revolution and evolution in the banking sector. To begin, we created an index of institutional change in the Argentina banking system from October 1992 to October 1998. Our starting date was determined by the capstone of the Convertibility Plan: the independence of the Central Bank.
The closing date was determined by data availability. In Argentina, three players can initiate banking regulation: the legislature, the executive office, and the Central Bank. Through laws and decrees, the legislature and executive office have the authority to initiate major changes in the regulatory structure while the Central Bank can deepen the institutional changes put in place by laws or decrees. For example the legislature passed a law giving independence to the Central Bank in October 1992. The executive office, through decree, authorized the creation of the Fondo Fiduciario. The Central Bank has the authority to change the capital requirements of commercial banks.
We created our index in the following manner: minor changes in regulation from the Central Bank received either 0.5 or 1, and major changes in regulation by law or decree received a 3. Our judgment of importance followed guidelines from the Basle Committee. In Figure 11 we present a graph of the index over time.
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Figure 11
There appears to be a relatively constant trend in our institutional index except for a break in late 1994, coincident with the Tequila crisis. As discussed earlier we want to test the causes of institutional change and the impact that institutional change had on the banking sector.
Institutional Index
To do so we constructed series on the following variables: Dollar Deposits (Dodep), Peso where ? captures the effect of the change in the level and ? the movement in the slope. Table 4 shows the values for these parameters. The estimate of ? indicates that there was a break in our series at the time of the Tequila crisis and this was followed by decrease in the rate of change. This is consistent with our narrative of revolution (reform prompted by crisis) and subsequent evolution (a slowdown in the rate of change following the crisis but institutional deepening). This is in contrast to the behavior of the other series of banking indicators, which display a break but no change in the subsequent growth following the break.
We are now in a position to perform Granger causality tests. 16 In Table 6 The null hypothesis H0: "y does not cause x" is tested as H0: ? i =0 for i=1,…,k. 1) The causes of institutional change are consistent with our narrative on the role of crises. The two series causing institutional change are Peso deposits and the monetary base. The first action taken by Argentines following the Tequila crisis was to convert pesos to dollars in order to hedge the risk from devaluation. As people withdrew pesos, the monetary base contracted. Both declines are signals to politicians and the Central Bank to "do something." As a result, the executive office, the legislature and the Central Bank initiated reforms. 2) Institutional change Granger causes dollar deposits. Reforms in the financial and banking system caused dollar deposits to grow. Between January 1991 and November 1998 dollar deposits grew by 1150%.
3) Both institutional change and total deposits cause an expansion in credit. This is no surprise. No doubt most of the causation is coming through the growth of deposits but the growth of deposits in turn results from a belief that the regulatory system reduces the likelihood of bank runs.
4) Institutional change does not cause loans to Provincial governments to increase and neither do loans to Provincial governments prompt institutional change. This is consistent with our historical narrative that stressed the importance of the October 1992 reform of the Central Bank. From this date on (our sample period) there should be no link between institutional change and loans to Provincial banks.
5) Deposits
Granger cause loans to Provincial governments. Again, as stressed in our narrative, the huge inflow in deposits following the Convertibility Plan allowed Provincial banks to continue to lend to Provincial governments, despite the questionable soundness of the loans.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we provide an analytical narrative of the political and economic causes and consequences of institutional changes in the Argentine banking system. We devote most of our attention to the privatization of the Provincial banks. Our story differs from the prevailing wisdom in its stress on the key roles played by convertibility and an independent Central Bank rather than the Fondo Fiduciario. Though there was more than a two year unanticipated lag between the law establishing an independent Central Bank and the wave of privatizations in 1995, this lag was a result of the enormous inflow of deposits into the system prompted by the successful reception of the Convertibility Plan. The deposit inflow allowed the Provincial banks to remain afloat despite their continued loans to the public sector. Once a crisis hit, causing a deposit outflow, many of the Provincial banks were doomed. The Fondo Fiduciario, which some authors credit for the privatizations, no doubt greased the wheels for privatization and perhaps saved the political lives of some politicians, but we do not see the Fondo Fiduciario as critical.
Along with the narrative we provide econometric results indicating that the fall in peso deposits and the contraction in the monetary base in the last quarter of 1994 caused the legislature, the executive office and the Central Bank to initiate reforms to maintain the Convertibility Plan. Once the reforms were in place they caused deposits and credit to grow. This set in motion a virtuous cycle with continued evolutionary institutional deepening such that the Asian and Russian crises had little impact on the banking system.
14. Perron(1989) . In Table B1 we summarize our test results.
18 Perron(1997) also mentions the loss of power that models with unknown breaks have. "There appears to be a clear trade-off between power and the amount of prior information one is willing to incorporate with respect to the choice of the break point." Our results indicate that we can reject the presence of a unit root for all of our variables except for our series on loans to Provincial governments (LPG). Consequently we can detrend these variables in order to obtain a stationary process. 
